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ABSTRACT
Objectives: Our aim was to estimate the rate of data
linkage error in Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) by
testing the HESID pseudoanonymisation algorithm
against a reference standard, in a national registry of
paediatric intensive care records.
Setting: The Paediatric Intensive Care Audit Network
(PICANet) database, covering 33 paediatric intensive
care units in England, Scotland and Wales.
Participants: Data from infants and young people
aged 0–19 years admitted between 1 January 2004
and 21 February 2014.
Primary and secondary outcome measures:
PICANet admission records were classified as matches
(records belonging to the same patient who had been
readmitted) or non-matches (records belonging to
different patients) after applying the HESID algorithm
to PICANet records. False-match and missed-match
rates were calculated by comparing results of the
HESID algorithm with the reference standard PICANet
ID. The effect of linkage errors on readmission rate
was evaluated.
Results: Of 166 406 admissions, 88 596 were true
matches (where the same patient had been
readmitted). The HESID pseudonymisation algorithm
produced few false matches (n=176/77 810; 0.2%) but
a larger proportion of missed matches (n=3609/
88 596; 4.1%). The true readmission rate was
underestimated by 3.8% due to linkage errors. Patients
who were younger, male, from Asian/Black/Other ethnic
groups (vs White) were more likely to experience a
false match. Missed matches were more common for
younger patients, for Asian/Black/Other ethnic groups
(vs White) and for patients whose records had missing
data.
Conclusions: The deterministic algorithm used to link
all episodes of hospital care for the same patient in
England has a high missed match rate which
underestimates the true readmission rate and will
produce biased analyses. To reduce linkage error,
pseudoanonymisation algorithms need to be validated
against good quality reference standards.
Pseudonymisation of data ‘at source’ does not itself
address errors in patient identifiers and the impact
these errors have on data linkage.
INTRODUCTION
To allow analysis of patients use of healthcare
across hospitals and over time, a data resource
needs to link together episodes of hospital
care that belong to the same person.1 In
England, Hospital Episode Statistics (HES)
are a data set containing data on admissions,
outpatient appointments and Accident and
Emergency attendances at National Health
Service (NHS) hospitals in England.1 Each
record is submitted to the Health and Social
Care Information Centre (HSCIC), who use
the HESID pseudonymisation algorithm2 to
identify all hospital records that should be
linked together across the NHS in England,
using a range of patient identiﬁers commonly
used internationally in administrative data
(eg, date of birth, sex, postcode, ID
number).2 HES are then released to research-
ers, with patient identiﬁers removed. The
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ This is the first study to evaluate the rate of data
linkage error in the Hospital Episode Statistics
(HES) pseudonymisation algorithm.
▪ The HESID pseudonymisation algorithm is
applied to a reference standard clinical data set,
the Paediatric Intensive Care Audit Network
(PICANet).
▪ When applied to PICANet data, HESID produces
a false match rate of 0.2% (higher for younger
patients, males and ethnic minority groups) and
a missed match rate of 4.1% (higher for younger
patients, ethnic minorities and those with
missing data) that underestimates the readmis-
sion rate by 3.8%.
▪ Results may not generalise beyond paediatric
intensive care settings.
▪ Data linkage error in HES itself may be higher,
because data quality is lower in HES than in
PICANet.
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data are then considered pseudonymised, because the
risk of identiﬁcation has been minimised, although not
removed. Researchers assume that hospital episodes with
the same HESID refer to the same patient.2 Concerns
have been raised that implausible clinical scenarios indi-
cate problems with data quality, which can be com-
pounded by the linkage algorithm (eg, a patient dies but
is then apparently readmitted).3 4 These data are used
widely and yet the extent of data linkage error in HES has
undergone no investigation against an external reference
standard.
Data linkage errors occur when algorithms apply the
same ID to more than one patient (a false match) or
when different IDs are applied to the same patient
(a missed match).5 6 Data linkage error has obvious clin-
ical implications relating to safety and conﬁdentiality7–9
and is known to introduce bias into statistical analysis.
For example, prevalence rates can be under-estimated
due to missed matches.10 Relative risks can be biased
and the direction of effects even reversed,11 as linkage
success is better for healthier subgroups of the popula-
tion. Commentators have highlighted the importance of
evaluating the extent of linkage error prior to analysis.12
To estimate the rate of data linkage error, an independ-
ent reference standard is needed that identiﬁes each
patient correctly.13 No such reference standard is cur-
rently available for HESID. Although the algorithm was
designed to minimise false matches, it has undergone
no evaluation to estimate either the false or the missed
match rate. The aim of the current study was to estimate
for the ﬁrst time, the rate of data linkage errors that
would be expected in HES when the HES pseudonymi-
sation algorithm is used to link the same patients in a
longitudinal hospital record. To highlight the potential
impact of these linkage errors on outcome measure-
ment, we identiﬁed patient groups most affected by
linkage error.
METHODS
To identify linkage errors, we used a reference standard
clinical data set with an independently allocated patient
ID. To identify causes of linkage errors, we used the
patient identiﬁers in the reference standard data. These
are the same patient identiﬁers used by the HES pseudo-
nymisation algorithm.
Reference standard: PICANet Patient Identification Number
The hospital data were drawn from the Paediatric
Intensive Care Audit Network (PICANet) database for
33 paediatric intensive care units in England, Scotland
and Wales (1 January 2004 to 21 February 2014). Since
2002, PICANet has collected data on admissions to
paediatric intensive care units (PICUs) in the UK and
Ireland.14 15 Data are entered by dedicated staff, inde-
pendent from the main hospital systems, including the
same patient identiﬁers used in the HES pseudoanony-
misation algorithm.
We used the PICANet Patient Identiﬁcation Number
(PICANet ID) as the reference standard deﬁning same
and different patients across multiple admissions over
time because it has a high level of accuracy, patient
data are reviewed in audits and by manual review and
there are high levels of completeness for key ﬁelds such
as sex (100%), date of birth (100%) and postcode
(96%). Completeness of these ﬁelds in HES is not pub-
lished by the HSCIC routinely, but their data cleaning
and extraction rules would suggest that sex and date of
birth are close to 100% complete. Postcodes were
missing for all birth episodes in 2011/2012 and missing
for 2.8% of newborns readmitted in 2011/2012.4 In
PICANet, systematic validation of NHS number, date of
birth, postcode (using the AFD tool: http://www.afd.co.
uk) and checks for missing or incongruous values are
carried out via a custom designed web data entry inter-
face that is accessed via a highly secure and restricted
login. All data processing takes place on the PICANet
secure server. Review of the completeness and accuracy
of records is carried out by Paediatric Intensive Care
Unit staff. This enabled us to compare what would
happen to patient records in PICANet if they were
pseudonymised by the HES algorithm. Additionally,
because PICANet has available the same identiﬁers as
used by the HES algorithm, we could identify which
patient identiﬁers caused data linkage errors following
pseudonymisation.
The PICANet PatientID is allocated using a range of
identiﬁers using a three-step probabilistic matching algo-
rithm, by the PICANet team: (1) Weights computed
separately for agreement and disagreement on each
identiﬁer (date of birth, surname, forename, NHS
number, local patient identiﬁer, postcode, sex) are
summed, and the highest scoring pair retained; (2) the
pair are classiﬁed as a non-match, possible match or def-
inite match; (3) possible matches are manually reviewed
to estimate match status. Missing data on identiﬁers is
permitted by assigning a zero weight. Unlike with the
HESID algorithm, the PICANet ID allows NHS number
to differ and still produce a match, if other identiﬁers
agree and produce a sufﬁciently high probability.
Data linkage algorithm: HESID
After data from the Secondary Use Service (SUS) are
submitted to the Health and Social Care Information
Centre (HSCIC) and have undergone data cleaning,16
HSCIC apply the pseudonymisation algorithm to link
hospital records belonging to the same patient together,
on the basis of deterministic linking on patient identi-
ﬁers at three steps: (1) match on sex, date of birth,
National Health Service (NHS) number; (2) match on
sex, date of birth, local patient identiﬁcation number
within hospital and postcode; (3) match on sex, date of
birth and postcode (excluding communal postcodes or
records with a different NHS number).2 This data
linkage algorithm is designed to minimise the number
of false matches, although it has undergone no formal
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evaluation until now. Patient identiﬁers are removed
before data are released to researchers, who use the
pseudonymised HESID to identify records belonging to
the same patient. We applied the HES pseudonymisation
algorithm to the same identiﬁers in the PICANet data
set and compared them with same and different patients
deﬁned by the PICANet PatientID.
Ethical approval
Collection of personally identiﬁable data has been
approved by the Patient Information Advisory
Group (now the NHS Health Research Authority
Conﬁdentiality Advisory Group) http://www.hra.nhs.uk/
documents/2015/05/piag-register-8.xls. We applied the
three-step HESID algorithm according to the rules
described in the publicly available documents (V.2)2 17
using Stata V.12.1 in order to assign a HESID to
PICANet records. This assigned the same HESID to two
records if sex and date of birth matched and any one of
the following three scenarios applied (a deterministic
algorithm): (1) same NHS number, (2) same local ID
within hospital and same postcode, (3) same postcode
(unless NHS number differs), excluding communal
postcodes. We then compared the results of the HESID
algorithm with the results of the probabilistic
PICANet algorithm. Treating PICANet ID as a gold
standard, we then calculated the proportion of true
matches, false matches, missed matches and true non-
matches. Next, we examined the different scenarios that
contributed to linkage success and linkage error, by
counting the number of combinations of each identiﬁer
pair that could occur.
For linked records (true or false matches), there were
81 possible outcomes of each of the four identiﬁers
being the same as each other, different from each other,
or missing (since there were four identiﬁers and three
possible outcomes; 34=81). For missed matches, this gen-
erated 324 possible scenarios because there were an add-
itional two identiﬁers (sex and date of birth) with two
possible values (22×34=324).
Age was calculated from date of birth and date of ﬁrst
admission. Estimated or partly anonymised dates of birth
were set to missing,18 since these would be considered
missing by the HESID algorithm. Sex was coded as male,
female or missing. Ethnic group was classiﬁed as White,
Mixed, Asian, Black, Other or Missing.19 NHS numbers
were considered valid if they passed the standard
Modulus 11 algorithm, were 10 digits long, did not have
10 identical digits and were not 1234567890.17
Area-based socioeconomic status was derived from the
Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD2010) score, a com-
prehensive summary of 38 markers of local socio-
economic deprivation across seven domains.20
Admissions were classiﬁed as planned or unplanned.
The number of admissions for each hospital was treated
as a proxy for hospital size. Hospital ID and local ID
number (both complete within PICANet) were used to
represent provider and local ID.
For the main analysis, multilevel logistic regression
with the maximum likelihood estimator in Stata V.12.1
was used to identify patient characteristics associated with
false matches (vs true matches) and in a separate model,
characteristics associated with missed matches (vs true
non-matches; see online supplementary appendix 1).
The second level of the model acknowledged that
patients were nested within different hospitals. Predictor
variables were age, sex, ethnic group (Mixed/Asian/
Black/Other/Missing vsvs White), unplanned admissions
(vs planned), tertile of socioeconomic deprivation
(middle vs low, high vs low), missing data on socio-
economic deprivation (typically due to missing post-
code), unit size (small/medium/large according to the
number of records). We also tested for interactions
between ethnicity and deprivation.
In a supplementary analysis, we re-ran the analysis
allowing partial matching on date of birth at step 1 of
the HES algorithm,2 to see if this rule inﬂuenced the
rate of linkage errors. Date of birth accuracy in
PICANet is relatively high however, so we evaluated the
impact of replacing 1%, 2% or 5% of the date of birth
values as missing and/or transposed (eg, dd/mm to
mm/dd, permitted by the HESID algorithm) on
linkage success. We also compared estimated to actual
readmission rates for different patient groups. We also
compared three different approaches to postcode valid-
ation (most strict, a balanced approach, most relaxed),
in order to evaluate whether data linkage errors were
sensitive to postcodes validation rules, ranging from
most strict (postcode area, postcode district, space,
postal sector, unit code) to most relaxed (spaces
removed).
As shown in ﬁgure 1, the study population comprised
166 516 records from PICANet. After excluding 110
(0.1%) records outside the age range 0–19 at ﬁrst admis-
sion, 166 406 were available for analysis. According to
PICANet ID, 88 596 (53.2%) of records were true
matches (had been readmitted during the period of
data capture 1 January 2004 to 21 February 2014). Using
the deterministic HES pseudonymisation algorithm used
to link unique patients over multiple episodes of care to
create the HESID, 85 163 (51.2%) were matches,
showing the HESID underestimated the true readmis-
sion rate by 3.8% (100×((53.2%–51.2%)/53.2%)); a risk
difference of 2%. Of the 85 163 matches according to
HESID, 176 were false matches (0.2% of 77 810 true
non-matches; 0.1% of all records). Of the 81 243 non-
matches according to the HESID pseudonymisation
algorithm, 3609 were missed matches (4.1% of 88 596
true matches; 2.2% of all records).
Table 1 shows the different combinations of identiﬁer
values that contributed to false matching. The largest
proportion of false matches involved NHS numbers that
were missing (n=131, 74.4%) and at least one other
identiﬁer differed. There were 38 (21.6%) records that
falsely matched even when the NHS number was the
same and at least one other identiﬁer differed. The
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remaining 7 (5%) false matches occurred for other
reasons.
Table 2 shows the different combinations of identiﬁer
values that produced missed matches, among records
where sex and date of birth matches—a requirement for
HESID at all three steps.
Scenarios where postcode differed accounted for the
largest proportion (n=1232, 34.1%), but missed matches
also occurred when postcode was the same (n=37, 1%).
Scenarios where sex or date of birth differed are shown in
online supplementary table S1. These all refer to records
that do belong to the same patient, but failed to match
according to the HESID pseudonymisation algorithm.
Table 3 shows the characteristics of patients experien-
cing at least one false match (n=115; 0.5% of matched
patients) or missed match (n=1554; 1.8% of non-matched
patients) within their records, separated according to
true match status as deﬁned by the PatientID reference
standard.
In multivariable logistic regression models (table 4)
with a random effect for hospital (allowing for between
hospital variation), false matches were more common
for younger patients (OR=0.95, 95% CI 0.90 to 0.99),
among males (OR=1.77, 95% CI 1.18 to 2.65), in Asian
(OR=3.16, 95% CI 1.51 to 6.62), Black (OR=4.12, 95%
CI 1.81 to 9.38) and Other ethnic groups (OR=3.23,
95% CI 1.93 to 5.39).
Missed matches were less likely to occur per each addi-
tional year of age (OR=0.93, 95% CI 0.92 to 0.94).
Missed matches were more common however, when
postcode and/or socioeconomic deprivation was missing
(OR=3.10, 95% 2.65, 3.62) and in Asian (OR=1.35, 95%
CI 1.03 to 1.77), Black (OR=3.59, 95% CI 2.84 to 4.53)
and Other (OR=2.38, 95% CI 2.07 to 2.73) ethnic
groups (table 4).
We found no signiﬁcant interaction between socio-
economic deprivation and ethnic minority status, and
no evidence that the combined effect of living in an
area of high deprivation and being in an ethnic minority
increased the odds of a missed match (see online sup-
plementary table S2).
In sensitivity analyses, increasing the proportion of
dates of birth that were transposed (eg, dd/mm to mm/
dd) or NHS numbers that contained typographical
Figure 1 Data linkage errors following application of the
Hospital Episode Statistics ID (HESID) algorithm to Paediatric
Intensive Care Audit Network (PICANet) records.
Table 1 Scenarios involving different combinations of patient identifiers that resulted in false matches (n=176, 0.1%)
Sex
(100% valid)
Date of birth
(100% valid)
NHS number
(58.5% valid)
Hospital
(100% valid)
Local ID
(100% valid)
Postcode
(98.3% valid)
False
matches n (%)
Scenarios involving NHS numbers that differ
1 1 0* 0 0 0 20 (11.8)
1 1 0* 0 0 1 70 (41.4)
1 1 0* 1 0 0 1 (0.6)
1 1 0* 1 0 1 39 (23.8)
1 1 0* 1 1 1 1 (0.6) =131 (74.4%)
Scenarios involving NHS numbers that match
1 1 1 0 0 0 33 (19.5)
1 1 1 1 0 0 4 (2.4)
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 (0.6) =38 (21.6%)
Other scenarios† 7 (4.0) =7 (5%)
1=identifier is the same, 0=identifier is different or missing.
*Records with missing NHS numbers are linked by the HESID algorithm, unless a different NHS number is present.
†These scenarios occur when a record has an NHS number (and can therefore link to other records) but is compared to an initial record
where the NHS number is missing and the postcode is different. The initial record itself can be linked to other records that have the same
postcode.
HESID, Hospital Episode Statistics ID; NHS, National Health Service.
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errors, increased the missed match and the readmission
rate (not shown). Repeating analyses using the most
strict validation rule for postcodes (postcode area,
postcode district, space, postal sector, unit code)
increased the missed match rate to 7.3% without inﬂu-
encing the false match rate of 0.2%. A more relaxed
Table 2 Scenarios involving different combinations of patient identifiers that resulted in missed matches (where sex and date
of birth match)
Sex Date of birth NHS number Hospital Local ID Postcode
Missed matches
(% of 3609)
Scenarios where NHS number differs and postcode differs
1 1 0 1 1 0 840 (23.3)
1 1 0 1 0 0 43 (1.2)
1 1 0 0 1 0 33 (0.9)
1 1 0 0 0 0 316 (8.8) =1232 (34.1%)
Scenarios where NHS number differs and postcode is the same
1 1 0 1 1 1 15 (0.4)
1 1 0 1 0 1 17 (0.5)
1 1 0 0 0 1 5 (0.1) =37 (1%)
Other scenarios (see online supplementary table S1) =2340 (64.8%)
NHS. National Health Service.
Table 3 Characteristics of linkage error for different patient groups
Matched patients Non-matched patients
At least
one false
(n=115)
All correct
(n=25 671) p Value
Total
(n=25 786)
At least
one missed
(n=1554)
All correct
(n=84 987) p Value
Total
(n=86 541)
Total (% of total) (% of total)
Age group
<1 month 14 (0.05) 7749 (ref) 7763 422 (0.49) 13 215 (ref) 13 637
1–12 months 48 (0.19) 8060 8108 509 (0.59) 23 268 23 777
1–4 years 39 (0.15) 4487 4526 315 (0.36) 20 849 21 164
5–10 years 12 (0.05) 2611 2623 177 (0.20) 12 149 12 326
11+ years 2 (0.01) 2764 0.52* 2766 126 (0.15) 15 405 <0.001* 15 531
Missing 0 0 – 0 5 (0.01) 101 0.03 106
Sex
Male 81 (0.31) 14 711 (ref) 14 792 862 (1%) 47 567 (ref) 48 429
Female 34 (0.13) 10 960 0.01 10 994 674 (0.78%) 37 281 0.96 37 955
Missing 0 0 0 18 (0.02%) 139 <0.001 157
Ethnic group
White 34 (0.13) 15 150 (ref) 15 184 562 (0.65) 52 590 (ref) 53 152
Mixed 2 (0.01) 576 0.55 578 25 (0.03) 1804 0.93 1829
Asian 10 (0.04) 2340 0.07 2350 89 (0.10) 6394 0.67 6483
Black 11 (0.04) 1021 <0.001 1032 69 (0.08) 3219 0.001 3288
Other 8 (0.03) 579 <0.001 587 114 (0.13) 1905 <0.001 2019
Missing 50 (0.19) 6005 <0.001 6055 695 (0.08) 19 075 <0.001 19 770
Admission
Planned 42 (0.16) 10 012 10 054 673 (0.78) 32 439 (ref) 33 112
Unplanned 73 (0.28) 15 659 0.59 15 732 881 (1.02) 52 548 <0.001 53 429
Deprivation
Low 32 (0.12) 7083 (ref) 7115 270 (0.31) 20 314 (ref) 20 584
Middle 38 (0.15) 6861 6899 311 (0.36) 21 194 21 505
High 25 (0.10) 6786 0.48* 6811 254 (0.29) 22 200 0.09* 22 454
Missing† 20 (0.08) 4941 0.62 4961 719 (0.83) 21 279 <0.001 21 998
Provider size
Small 47 (0.18) 8900 (ref) 8947 535 (0.62) 31 102 (ref) 31 637
Medium 24 (0.09) 7275 7299 606 (0.70) 27 026 27 632
Large 44 (0.17) 9496 0.53* 9540 413 (0.48) 26 859 0.18* 27 272
*p Values for linear trend across groups (univariate).
†Typically due to missing postcode data.
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validation rule for postcodes (removing spaces entirely)
decreased the missed match rate to 3.8% but increased
the false match rate to 3.4%.
Additional analyses using more detailed ethnic groups
showed that Black African (OR=2.62, 95% CI 1.32 to
5.23) patients were more likely to experience false
matches than White infants, but there were insufﬁcient
numbers of Black Carribean or Black Other patients to
obtain estimates for these groups. The ethnic group
coded as Other comprised Chinese and Other Ethnic
categories. Repeating the model for missed matches
with these more detailed categories showed a larger and
signiﬁcant effect for the Other Ethnic group (OR=3.19,
95% CI 2.62 to 3.90) than the effect seen for Chinese
infants (OR=1.70, 95% CI 0.82 to 3.53).
DISCUSSION
Statement of principal findings
Our results are the ﬁrst evaluation of data linkage errors
in hospital administrative records for England. The algo-
rithm has a false match rate of 0.2% and a high missed
match rate of 4.1% when applied to paediatric intensive
care records, and is particularly sensitive to postcode.
The true readmission rate was under-estimated by 3.8%,
owing to the high missed match rate. In HES itself, the
rates of linkage error are likely to be higher, given that
HES has known issues with data quality,1 4 16 21 and
known variation in the quality of data submitted by pro-
viders.1 4 22 Additionally, no reference standard data set
with patient identiﬁers currently exists.2 Also for the ﬁrst
time, our study highlights that ethnic minority patients
(Black, Asian, Other) and patients with missing data in
their records, are more affected by data linkage errors.
Strengths and weaknesses
This study uses a clinical data set from UK hospitals,
with the same identiﬁers available in HES and an
independent reference standard patient ID to illustrate
the linkage errors that arise when applying the HES
linkage and pseudonymisation algorithm used to link
national HES data for the NHS in England. Similar iden-
tiﬁers are used in administrative data internationally, sug-
gesting that the scenarios identiﬁed will generalise to
other settings. Errors in patient identiﬁers, and missing
data, occur even in well-validated data sets such as
PICANet and have implications for analysis. In our study,
the difference between the true readmission rate and
the rate calculated after linkage was 2%, a clinically
important and statistically signiﬁcant underestimation.
The emerging literature on data linkage errors has
shown that as missed/false matches increase, event rates
are underestimated/overestimated respectively.10 12
Distorted relative risks can lead to erroneous assessment
of relative hospital performance,23 and based associa-
tions between risk-factors and outcomes, even where
overall linkage rates are high.11 Linkage errors can also
result in clinical harm and breaches of conﬁdentiality.9
Meaning of the study: possible explanations and
implications for clinicians and policymakers
Our study was concerned with internal data linkage (ie,
linkage between the same individual recorded multiple
times within a longitudinal record). When attempts are
made to link one data set with another (external data
linkage, eg, HES with another administrative data set),
linkage success falls to the ‘lowest common denomin-
ator’—it depends on the quality of patient identiﬁers in
both data sets. Having access to patient identiﬁers
allowed us to identify speciﬁcally that the majority of
linkage errors were caused by discrepancies in NHS
number and/or postcode (either missing or incorrect).
This detailed information provides the opportunity to
improve linkage algorithms (eg, by allowing records
including missing postcodes to match if other identiﬁers
are the same).
Table 4 OR (95% CIs) for patients having at least one false (n=82) or missed (n=2499) match
At least one false match
p Value
At least one missed match
p ValueOR (95% CI) OR (95% CI)
Age 0.95 (0.90 to 0.99) 0.03 0.93 (0.92 to 0.94) <0.001
Male 1.77 (1.18 to 2.65) 0.006 0.98 (0.89 to 1.09) 0.75
Unplanned admissions 0.93 (0.63 to 1.38) 0.71 1.03 (0.92 to 1.16) 0.61
Provider medium size (vs small) 0.59 (0.25 to 1.40) 0.23 0.80 (0.41 to 1.58) 0.52
Provider large size (vs small) 0.78 (0.31 to 1.93) 0.59 0.67 (0.30 to 1.49) 0.32
Deprivation=missing (vs low) 1.25 (0.68 to 2.30) 0.48 3.10 (2.65 to 3.62) <0.001
Deprivation=medium (vs low) 1.26 (0.77 to 2.05) 0.35 0.91 (0.77 to 1.08) 0.30
Deprivation=high (vs low) 0.99 (0.57 to 1.73) 0.98 0.79 (0.66 to 0.95) 0.01
Ethnic group=missing (vs White) 1.25 (0.30 to 5.26) 0.76 0.92 (0.61 to 1.39) 0.69
Ethnic group=Mixed (vs White) 1.56 (0.75 to 3.25) 0.24 1.17 (0.92 to 1.48) 0.20
Ethnic group=Asian (vs White) 3.16 (1.51 to 6.62) 0.02 1.35 (1.03 to 1.77) 0.03
Ethnic group=Black (vs White) 4.12 (1.81 to 9.38) 0.001 3.59 (2.84 to 4.53) <0.001
Ethnic group=Other (vs White) 3.23 (1.93 to 5.39) <0.001 2.38 (2.07 to 2.73) <0.001
B (95% CI) B (95% CI)
Between-hospital variance* 0.75 (0.47 to 1.22) 0.80 (0.61 to 1.04)
*SD of the hospital-level effect.
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A move from deterministic to probabilistic matching
would allow records to match when NHS number dif-
fered but all other identiﬁers were the same.6 Allowing
records to match based on hospital and local ID would
also reduce the missed match rate (see online supple-
mentary table S1), even if the deterministic approach
were retained, with little impact on the false match
rate. It may also be possible to use prior knowledge
about the probability that two records will match in
algorithms themselves.13 24 Errors in patient identiﬁers
and their impact on data linkage success however,
cannot be evaluated without access to patient identiﬁers
and a reference standard. The Personal Demographics
Service (PDS) is one possible reference standard for
HES, since it purports to be the national demographic
database.25 Record linkage on a large scale should
involve a system of manual review in order to deter-
mine linkage quality, which involves checking patient
identiﬁers.26
Unanswered questions and future research
In addition to modifying the algorithm, errors in patient
identiﬁers can be improved by improving data quality at
source and with improvement to patient tracing skills25
and other mechanisms that generate linkage errors.4
Particular problems with accuracy of identiﬁers for
ethnic minority patients might reﬂect frontline staff
being unfamiliar with naming conventions.27 We were
unable to determine which speciﬁc ethnic groups were
experiencing the most linkage problems, beyond the
broad categories of Black, Asian and Other. Missing data
is a further issue, even for mandated ﬁelds in HES such
as ethnic group.21 28 It is important to evaluate and
improve data linkage, for the scientiﬁc reasons men-
tioned above but also legal and ethical reasons.29 The
beneﬁts of linkage of NHS data for service evaluation
and research are considered to justify use of patient data
without explicit patient consent (Section 251 of the
NHS Act 2006), with the HSCIC having legal responsibil-
ity for performing the linkage centrally and removing
patient identiﬁers.29 However, if linkage results in biased
estimates, particularly for certain disadvantaged groups,
this justiﬁcation is undermined.
Proposals to pseudonymise patient identiﬁers ‘at
source’30 by local providers, rather than centrally at
the HSCIC, could further undermine the justiﬁcation for
linking together hospital care records. Pseudonymisation
at source involves identiﬁers being replaced with a
‘hashed’ identiﬁer before they are released from the pro-
vider (whether containing errors or not). This procedure
would not address errors in patient identiﬁers and could
increase data linkage error by locking errors in patient
identiﬁers permanently into the data. This would lead to
additional biases and prevent manual review that could
identify the source of problems, as we have done here.31
Although it is possible to use probabilistic matching with
pseudonymisation at source,32 it is not possible to evalu-
ate errors in identiﬁers following pseudonymisation at
source. This means that there can be no manual review
(often considered an important step when using prob-
abilistic matching) and no evaluation of the impact of
errors in identiﬁers on linkage success. Researchers need
to collaborate with data providers and those designing
data linkage algorithms, in order to reduce errors in
patient identiﬁers, data linkage errors and their harmful
consequences.
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